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"Given that the soul of a human being is only a 
thinking substance, how can it affect the bodily 
spirits, in order to bring about voluntary actions?"
Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia to Descartes, 1643 
The philosophical skepticism -moulding into a scientific skepticism in later years of the dualist hypothesis ultimately began with the objection by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia levelled against Descartes in 1643. Descartes’ 
1  I would like to thank the Reviewer and Editor of Conatus for their patient and helpful reviews of the initial draft of 
this paper. I would also like to thank Prof. John Thorp for his metaphysics lectures -an essential space where I could 
formulate, and be challenged on, the thesis presented in this paper. 
Disintegrating Particles, Non-Local 
Causation and Category Mistakes: 
What do Conservation Laws have to 
do with Dualism?1
Abstract
The single most influential and widely accepted objection against any form of dualism, the 
belief that human beings are both body and soul, is the objection that dualism violates 
conservation laws in physics. The conservation laws objection against dualism posits that 
body and soul interaction is at best mysterious, and at worst impossible. While this objection 
has been both influential from the time of its initial formulation until present, this paper 
occupies itself with arguing that this objection is a fleeting one, and has successful answers 
from both scientific and philosophical perspectives. It is to this end that I provide three groups 
of responses to the conservation laws objection. First, I outline responses which take the 
‘laws of nature’ as the proper entry point into the discussion. Secondly, I provide an analysis 
of those who argue that contemporary quantum physical data requires that the objection 
itself involves scientifically unjustified premises. Finally, I layout a philosophically oriented 
answer which argues that the objection is linguistically problematic since its demands on the 
dualist are categorically fallacious. From these groups of answers, I conclude that while the 
conservation laws objection has been arguably the most widely accepted objection against 
dualism, the objection is without philosophical justification.
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Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) famously argues that the self is an immaterial 
‘thing’ distinct from the physically extended body. Having desired to sweep away all 
heretofore beliefs -developing his classical foundationalist epistemology-2 he writes: 
“But what, then, am I? A thinking thing, it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? 
It is a thing that doubts, understands [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, that 
imagines and also perceives.”3 However, while the causal effectivity of such acts 
of the intellect might be questionable in itself, critics of Descartes’ philosophical 
anthropology level a more lethal objection. The objection moves from the skepticism 
of a ‘thinking substance’ or ‘immaterial thing (self, soul, ego, et cetera)’ causally 
interacting with an ‘extended body (physical substance, material object, et cetera).’ 
Since the initial formulation of the problem, the objection has taken on a number of 
forms, and this paper attempts to engage with the objection in its most substantial 
formulations.4 In this paper, then, I will exegetically present current perspectives 
in response to perhaps the most popular objection -variation, really, of Princess 
Bohemia’s objection- to (almost any5) form of dualism; namely, the objection from 
the violation of conservation laws in physics. The free-will problem seems to be, 
for the dualist, relatively straightforward and linear; however, the problem is not 
establishing freedom of the soul per se, but of the soul and body conjunction.6 I 
will take libertarianism to be roughly the view that a human being is free at a given 
moment, if and only if one can choose between two alternatives (x v not-x) without 
antecedent, determining causes.7 I will take, then, ‘libertarian dualist’ to be the 
philosophical anthropological view -or view within the philosophy of mind- that in 
addition to libertarian free-will, the thesis that there is a body and soul -whatever their 
exact relation- is correct. So, two relevant questions arise: Even if the soul is free, 
how could it, in conjunction with the body, be free? More specifically, even granting 
this conjunction of soul and body, how could the soul and body be free, given that 
the soul cannot interact with the body (since it allegedly violates conservation laws)? 
For the dualist, then, the second of these questions is most important -since, without 
an answer, libertarian dualism must be given up. Structurally, then, I will lay out this 
paper by providing an exegesis of the main strategies for dealing with the objection 
from the violation of conservation laws, make brief observations about each of 
them, and conclude that while none of these suggestions establish their conclusion 
2  For an extensive exegesis and criticism of classical foundationalism see Alvin Plantinga’s Warrant: The Current Debate 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
3  René Descartes, “Meditations”, in The Rationalists (New York: Anchor Press, 1960), Meditation II, 122.
4  In this sense, this paper could be interpreted as doing part of the serious metaphysical work which, in the words 
of John Hawthorne in his “Cartesian Dualism”, moves beyond treating merely the “pale caricature” of dualism, and 
its constant “frivolous dismissal[s].” Printed in Dean Zimmerman and Peter van Inwagen’s Persons: Human and Divine 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 98.
5  I am unsure that Thomistic dualism is affected -but at any rate if it does (which I will grant for the sake of argument), 
this paper responds to it anyhow.
6  For instance, it would not really matter if the soul was free if when conjoined with the body it was not (you would get, 
as it were, Stoic freedom where you could assent or dissent to actions as a spectator, but really make no real difference 
to the choices you perform that occur by necessity). I am indebted to Prof. J. Thorp’s class for this historical note.  
7  Sometimes called the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP).
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conclusively, the objection from conservation laws is at best (currently) the best 
objection, but one less philosophically forceful than it is usually purported to be. 
More relevant to free will, if the libertarian relies on dualism to secure free will, to 
even get off the ground the conservation problem must be satisfactorily answered.
The characterization of the conservation law objection to dualism as, in the 
words of Kenneth Himma, “none thought to be more damaging”,8 should not be 
taken lightly; it is certainly the most popular -or most well-known- objection offered. 
However, there have been many notable attempts to respond to the problem 
of dualism violating conservation laws which merit philosophical attention. The 
arguments, though, are typically based on alleged inconsistencies with well-attested 
scientific theories. In this sense, the dichotomy involves a scientific theory, and a 
philosophical position -the latter, of course, takes precedence a priori. Hence, the 
dualist’s response must involve consideration of (i) the nature of scientific laws, 
(ii) the allegation of dualism’s inconsistency with those purported laws and (iii) a 
model in which the dualist -without being ad hoc- rejects those laws or shows how 
the alleged inconsistency is only apparent. Let me sketch the problem briefly, and, 
thereafter, lay out each of these distinct methods of dealing with the problem. I 
will also forestall a definition of “conservation laws”, since there are different laws 
purported to be broken, and so I will only specify when necessary. The problem 
runs something like the following. Consider the movement of a billiard ball striking 
another billiard ball. We can reduce this to something like the causal formula ‘x 
causes y’. Leaving spatial questions aside,9 it is a relatively straightforward case: The 
ball itself has the capacity, or perhaps propensity, to move another ball in virtue of 
its properties i.e., having causal powers, being of such a shape as to be able to hit 
and causally affect another object, et cetera, in conjunction with its being hit by 
the stick ultimately moved by the person. The question, then, arises: Can a soul or 
mind or self (supposing it to be non-physical) causally affect a material object?10 
While an objection might be raised that this begs the question in that we are unsure 
about exactly what “material” or “physical” or even “nonphysical” means, I should 
like to respond that standard definitions suffice for our purposes, and it is best to 
overlook such a problem for now. Suppose that “matter” turns out to be just energy. 
One can still ask “how can something non-material (with no energy) causally affect 
something material (with energy)?”. The same sorts of questions can be generated—
and so the objection from ignorance is without warrant. But, assuming common 
8  Kenneth Einar Himma, “What is a problem for all is a problem for none: Substance dualism, physicalism, and the mind-
body problem”, American Philosophical Quarterly 42, no. 2 (2005): 81.
9  One might want to ask “where did the causality take place?”, for instance. In a brief reply, while this is a meaningful 
question, it is at best irrelevant in this discussion. What matters is that a cause occurred, its spatial location is 
unimportant i.e., in any arbitrarily chosen location there is still causality. 
10 If one speaks generally of “a non-physical thing interacting with a physical thing”, one’s analysis is without much merit. 
For instance, it is likely that not a “non-physical thing” cannot causally affect a “physical thing” as such, but only 
something like a substantial soul with the inherent capacity to causally interact with physical things. In other words, 
souls should not be thought of as abstracta. 
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sense definitions, -pace Berkeley- the question remains, and the question can be put 
more precisely: Given the law of conservation of mass and energy (matter and energy 
can neither go out of existence nor come into existence), how should we think of the 
dualist claim that a non-material thing can causally affect a material thing?  Let me 
briefly outline some responses to the problem. 
For simplicity, I will bundle the responses together. So, in the first group, 
there will be the “laws of nature” group which suggest that re-valuating the laws 
themselves seems to beget positive implications for thinking about conservation 
laws and dualism. Secondly, there is the “quantum mechanics” group which suggest 
that our current science makes improbable the objection from the violation of 
conservation laws. Lastly, I will give the “Craig-Moreland” response to the problem 
that the objection to dualism is semantically meaningless since “how” questions are 
mechanical, scientific questions and the soul’s interaction with the body is not a 
scientific process operative through a medium of some sort i.e., energy exchange. I 
will now lay out these groups of positions.11 To begin, C.S Lewis has written on the 
subject of the ‘laws of nature’, which I think is valuable to note as an initial response 
to the problem. Lewis’ concern with the philosophical debate of dualism was not 
in mind in his paper; however, his contribution, though indirect, provides a useful 
conceptual framework in which scientific laws are interpreted. In this way, Lewis 
attempts to provide an ontological backdrop to the debate which is logically prior to 
the discussion of whether dualism violates laws—since delineating what these ‘laws’ 
are is explanatorily crucial. In his “The Laws of Nature”, he writes the following:
“Up till now I had had a vague idea that the laws of Nature could make 
things happen. I now saw that this was exactly like thinking that you could 
increase your income by doing sums about it. The laws are the pattern to 
which events conform: the source of events must be sought elsewhere.”12
By way of application, Lewis is suggesting that we think of laws as mere rules 
of nature, and not as causally efficacious ones. More relevantly, Lewis begins the 
discussion I am presenting here by noting that the laws do not causally affect anything 
i.e., if no soul acts in a body, the body thus operates solely based on laws; rather, 
Lewis points out that the laws are just patterns to which events conform, and so there 
is no a priori internal inconsistency in affirming the soul’s causal activity. While Lewis 
does not take us to, nor answer the question of, the conservation laws themselves, 
Lewis’ note serves as a precursor to Alvin Plantinga’s formulation of the laws of 
11 This paper should not be taken as fundamentally exhaustive of all the ‘groups’ of responses that could be listed. The 
‘groups’ I have devised to explicate are to my mind significant contributions to the discussion, and thus are printed here 
in a relatively chronological fashion. A future paper might involve (i) conjunctions of the aforementioned ‘groups’, (ii) 
additional ‘groups’ as well as (iii) nuanced versions of the groups heretofore spoken of. All of this is naturally beyond 
the scope of the paper itself—and in this sense this paper intentionally aims at narrowing the scope of the problem. 
12 C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, Michigan and Cambridge: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1970), 73.
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nature as a contribution to the debate in question. The context in which Plantinga is 
writing is within the domain of the science and religion controversy, and in particular 
the question of the philosophical legitimacy of miracles. Thus, his understanding of 
scientific laws is derivative from his analysis of the concept of ‘miracles’, and their 
respective modal status. However, this metaphysical approach to the concept of 
‘law’ clarifies the debate in the sense that the question of ‘laws’ -in the context of 
miracles, or, I suggest, dualism- isn’t strictly speaking scientific, but philosophical.13 
In his Where the Conflict Really Lies (2011), Plantinga gives a definition of ‘laws of 
nature’ which is rather hospitable to dualism:
“(LN) When the universe is causally closed (when God is not acting specially 
in the world), P. For example, Newton’s law of gravity would go as follows: 
(G) When the universe is causally closed, any two material objects attract 
each other with a force proportional to the product of their masses and 
inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.”14
As such, on Plantinga’s framework, it could be added that the universe is not 
causally closed but that it involves acts which do not break the laws per se but which 
operate within the framework of a causally open universe. In Plantinga’s view, the 
answer to whether the universe is open or closed is not really a scientific question; 
rather, it is a metaphysical or theological question.15 Thus, so Plantinga could argue, 
the soul by causally affecting a material body does not violate laws because there 
is an implicit ceteris paribus clause which leaves this “causal space” open. In this 
sense, this answers the conservation law objection since there are, technically, no 
laws being violated.16 While this might not help the dualist exactly even if true i.e., 
conservation laws would be broken at every instant, it points us in the right direction 
(at least prima facie): Why hold the conservation laws at all? As aforementioned, 
the question is philosophical: It asks about the consistency between the propositions 
dualism is true and the conservation laws must be kept. However, another group, the 
‘quantum mechanics’ group, asks the deeper question of the necessity of holding 
conservation laws at all.
Quantum physics, the study of sub-elementary particles, so says this group, 
makes more plausible the dualist claim that a non-material thing can causally affect 
a material thing. Up first is Karl R. Popper, who, in his The Self and Its Brain (1985) 
argues that these ‘conservation laws’ had to be given up on scientific grounds (not 
13 Though he says ‘metaphysical’ or ‘theological’.
14 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 80.
15 In addition, I don’t think we necessarily need to be closed a priori to such explanations. See my “Theistic Explanations 
of the Ontology of Consciousness”, Discussions 13, no.1 (2017): 17-23.
16 I suppose the best objection to this is to suggest that this leaves God as acting arbitrarily in the world. For an answer 
which Plantinga gives in response, see his and Daniel Dennett’s Science and Religion: Are They Compatible? (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 63-65.
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exactly quantum mechanical grounds, but something in the scientific neighborhood):
“The new theory could explain the push between pieces of matter (the 
'impenetrability of matter') by the electrical repulsion of equally charged 
particles (the electron shells of the atoms). This was convincing, but it 
destroyed the idea that push was 'essential', depending on the essential 
space-filling property of matter, and that push was the model of all physical 
causal action. Other elementary particles are now known which cannot be 
interpreted as charged (or uncharged) bits of matter -matter in the sense of 
materialism- for they are unstable: they disintegrate. Moreover, even stable 
particles like electrons can be pairwise annihilated, with the production of 
photons (light quanta); and they can be created, out of a photon (a gamma 
ray). But light is not matter, though we may say that light and matter are 
forms of energy. Thus, the law of conservation of matter (and of mass) had 
to be given up.”17
Popper thus suggests that conservation laws as an argument against dualism 
is without merit; for given counter-examples to the “push” theory of matter 
interaction i.e., unstable bits of matter, as well as counter-examples to the notion 
that matter cannot be destroyed i.e., electrons being pairwise annihilated, the 
notion that dualism violates conservation laws, even if true, is without much 
merit, since that law itself should be given up. One might suggest, though, that 
really what is happening is an avoidance of the real problem, since what one wants 
to know is how the soul moves the body (if it does) -emphasis on ‘how.’ Does 
it do it through some mechanical process with energy exchange, for instance? It 
should be noted that what is happening here -as happened with the initial alleged 
inconsistency between dualism and conservation laws- is the calling into question 
the scientific legitimacy of dualism. It should be noted that this doesn’t implicitly 
(nor explicitly) undermine the philosophical discussion that is taking place. The claim 
between the irreconcilability of conservation laws with dualism is a philosophical 
position, since it charges propositional inconsistency. As such, re-call that earlier in 
this paper I noted that a philosophical discussion of the matter would involve the 
consideration of the laws themselves, as well as the necessity of their constancy. 
In this way, the considerations from science do not supplant, but supplement, the 
philosophical discussion taking place. The motivation for or against dualism might 
be philosophical, religious or scientific; what is clear, though, is that the implications 
of the scientific data for dualism are intrinsically significant, since depending on 
one’s answer to the question of the scientific laws in general, one can generate 
17 Karl Popper and J. C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (New York: Springer International, 1985), 6-7. As a typographical 
note, I do not omit Eccles’ name from the essay accidentally insofar as ‘Part 1’ of the book is written exclusively by 
Popper. For a critical review of Popper’s interactionist dualism, see Wilfrid Sellar’s “A Note on Popper’s Argument for 
Dualism”, Analysis 15 (1954/55): 23-24.
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one’s philosophical position.18 Alongside Popper’s defense resides philosopher 
Robin Collins’ defense, in his essay “Modern Physics and the Energy Conservation 
Objection to Mind-Body Dualism.” He notes, significantly, that “underlying the 
EC [energy conservation] objection is the idea that causal interaction requires 
an exchange of energy.”19 He gives a lengthy counter-example to the claim that 
energy exchange is needed in fields like quantum physics. The thought here is not to 
prove definitively that such interaction actually takes place, but that positing this 
occurrence does not violate any known laws and has an analogical counter-part in 
the realm of quantum physics. Consider the following scenario:
“…consider two particles each with a spin of 1/2-- say two nitrogen (N) atoms 
-- initially bound together to form a system (such as the nitrogen molecule, 
N2) with a total spin of zero. Suppose we break these particles apart in a 
spaceship between Earth and Mars, with one of the particles going to Earth 
and one to Mars. Call the Earth-bound particle p
E
 and Mars-bound particle 
p
M
. Further, suppose there is an observer on each planet that will measure 
the spin (in some prearranged direction Z) of the particle that arrives on her 
planet. Quantum mechanics dictates that each observer will either measure 
her particle as having a spin of +1/2 or -1/2. Further, because of conservation 
of spin and the fact that they are measuring the spin in the same direction Z, 
quantum mechanics dictates that if the Earth observer measures p
E
 as +1/2, 
then the Mars observer will measure p
M
 as -1/2, and vice versa: that is, the 
measurement results are anti-correlated.  Consequently, if our Earth observer 
measures p
E
 as +1/2, she knows that the Mars observer will measure p
M
 as 
-1/2. The seemingly obvious explanation of this is that when the two particles 
were initially separated on the ship, the process of separation caused each 
of them to be in some definite state that was anti-correlated with its partner 
-- e.g., the p
M
 was forced into a +1/2 state while p
E
 was forced into a -1/2 
state. This explanation is an example of what is called local causation. To 
18 I would like to make two notes here. First, I am not espousing the logical priority of science over philosophy; I merely 
suggest that if ‘laws’ are part of the discussion and their nature is a scientific question—while things like whether 
there are ceteris paribus clauses within what is denoted by them aren’t—then the philosophical discussion must work 
in conjunction with the scientific question. (Though one might object that conservation laws are simply irrelevant, as 
Moreland and Craig will argue later). Secondly, the importance of the considerations of the scientific data should not 
be underestimated in general. In fact, E. J. Lowe has suggested that the “serious area of concern” just is this scientific 
inconsistency: “The more serious area of concern is created by the suspicion that dualist views of the mind- body 
relation — and certainly those that are interactionist — are somehow at odds with the findings of modern physical 
science: not only physiology and neurology, but also, more fundamentally, physics itself.” E. J. Lowe, “The Problem of 
Psychophysical Causation”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 3 (1992): 263. Contrariwise, the opposite could 
be the case and there might be a ‘scientific case’ for dualism to be made: “…one might argue for dualism "on scientific 
grounds" in two ways: one, we are directly aware of the existence of something which, it happens, science cannot 
reduce to the material; two, to explain human behavior we must posit the existence of something which, in order to 
do its explanatory job, must have properties unlike those of matter.” Alan Sussman, “Reflections on the chances for 
a scientific dualism”, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 95. The legitimacy of such an endeavor, of course, lies outside 
the scope of this paper. 
19 Ibid., 13.
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see why this explanation only needs to invoke local causation, first note 
that it explains why pE was measured as +1/2 by saying that it had a certain 
attribute, being in a +1/2 state, that caused the measuring apparatus on 
Earth to register +1/2. This causation is purely local, since once p
E
 hits the 
apparatus, there is no longer any relevant spatial distance between it and 
the apparatus. In the same way, it explains using only local causation why 
the Mars observer apparatus registered -1/2 when measuring the spin of p
M
. 
Finally, only local causation is required to explain why the two particles 
started off in their respective spin states via the mechanism that separated 
the two particles: when the two particles were bound together on the ship, 
no relevant spatial distance separated them from the mechanism that split 
them apart and imparted to them their respective spins, and hence only local 
causation was involved.”20
Despite the intricacies and details of Collins’ argument,21 the question 
becomes, simply, “why can we not just posit local causation as the explanation 
of the correlations?”. He notes that with John Bell’s theorem vindicated in 1966, 
local causality as an explanation of the correlations is problematic. Indeed, he 
notes, since 1977 the predictions of quantum physics -implying local causality (i.e., 
energy exchange) as an explanation of the correlations as insufficient- have been 
vindicated.22 This situation that Collins outlines is not merely restricted to isolated 
cases but “pervasive throughout the microscopic world, playing a fundamental role 
in the operation of nature”.23 Given Collins’ argument, we should, then, ask the 
following derivative philosophical question: If there is no energy exchange taking 
place between soul and body (presumably), then how does the soul causally affect 
the body? What sort of mechanism is specifiable here? The philosophical implications 
of the quantum physical data are thus clear: Irregardless of one’s theory of laws, 
quantum physics supplants the objection from conservation laws and updates the 
objection itself. The argument from conservation laws is, so says Collins, scientifically 
outdated; quantum physics gives us the philosophical ‘right’ -if I may use this term- 
to adopt a philosophical anthropology in which, say, causal interaction between 
soul and body is acceptable. While the argument for this conclusion is based on the 
scientific data available, the philosophical implications should not go unnoticed. I 
suggest two basic philosophical implications if Collins’ argument is correct. Firstly, 
quantum physical data will positively supplement the debate regarding dualism; 
it lends credence to the idea that the soul -body or mind- body interaction is less 
20 Robin Collins, “Modern Physics and the Energy Conservation Objection to Mind-Body Dualism”, http://home.
messiah.edu/~rcollins/Mind-Body%20Problm/Modern%20Physics%20and%20the%20Energy%20Conservation%20
Objection%20to%20Mind-body%20Dualism.doc.
21 I only re-print his scenario in full inasmuch as what is required -for the objector to dualism from conservation laws- is a 
clear-cut case of non-local explanation which brings into question the necessity for local energy exchange. 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
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mysterious and problematic than once thought. Secondly, if Collins is correct, it is 
ceteris paribus possible to suggest that progress in the field of philosophy has taken 
place; the dualism which was rejected based on an obscure, vague notion of the 
causality taking place is less vague given the mysteriousness of the same phenomena 
in the quantum world.24 This notwithstanding, the last group, the ‘Craig-Moreland’ 
group, will attempt to provide a philosophical answer to this question of the ‘how-
question’ from a more philosophical perspective of the analysis of ‘how-questions’ in 
general.
In their Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, J. P. Moreland 
and William Lane Craig offer an interesting response which may be unsatisfying for 
many,25 but nonetheless merits attention. Their approach -from the analytic tradition 
in philosophy- is to analyze the linguistic formulation of the problem itself. Consider 
again an overview of the objection against dualism, schematized as an argument:
 
1 Any causal interaction from x to y must involve a mechanical, intermediary 
process specifiable, in principle, in scientific terms.
2 There is no mechanical, intermediary process specifiable, in principle, in 
scientific terms, regarding the soul’s interaction with the body.
3 Therefore, dualism does not answer the how of the soul and body causal 
interaction, since there is no mechanical, intermediary process specifiable, 
in principle, in scientific terms.
The crucial premise is (1). The presupposition of the incoherence of a causal 
interaction without a mechanical, intermediary process is what is in question here; 
for these sorts of causal interactions are scientifically specifiable interactions i.e., 
describing how a billiard ball hits another billiard ball—and thus answers the ‘how’ 
of the process. Consider what Craig and Moreland suggest to this:
“...it may even be that a “how” question regarding the interaction between 
mind and body cannot even arise. A question about how A causally interacts 
with B is a request for an intervening mechanism between A and B that can be 
described…The interaction between mind and body may, and most likely is, 
direct and immediate. There is no intervening mechanism, and thus a “how” 
question describing that mechanism does not even arise.”26
24 Alex Pruss argues for something similar regarding the mysteriousness of physical objects in general.
25 Especially advocates of epistemological scientism. Though one could hold scientism and simultaneously hold that as 
long as there are material effects of the soul i.e., its moving the body, one could admit a non-material soul i.e., for 
its explanatory power. I suppose that even if the electron was non-material, we would still posit it for its explanatory 
power as we already do. Or maybe not—I am not sure (and it doesn’t concern me much since I reject scientism).
26 William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, Illinois: 
Intervarsity Press, 2001), 243-244.
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On this view, the soul contacting the physical body does not have an interaction 
process or intermediary into which or through which the soul causally affects the body. 
Thus, no energy exchange takes place at all (and so no conservation laws are broken 
-though if Popper is right, this doesn’t matter, and if Collins is right, this should be 
without worry viz-a-viz quantum mechanics). While this analysis of ‘how’ questions in 
the context of the debate seems ad hoc,27 it has the virtue of (i) keeping the conservation 
laws (what the objector wants to preserve) and (ii) is consistent with a rejection (or 
acceptance) of Bell’s theorem. As such, there is no interaction problem between the 
soul and body in that there are no laws broken. A demand, then, for a ‘how’ of the 
interaction presupposes that such interaction is mechanistic; since this is simply begging 
the question, there simply is no problem. The implications of this is that the question of 
dualism is really philosophical. The debate over whether scientific laws are inconsistent 
with dualism is ad hoc, since it makes a category mistake of applying scientific laws 
to what is meta-scientific, that is, something which is exempt from the realm of the 
scientific domain i.e., the soul does not obey physical laws. While the consistency 
between scientific theories and dualism seemed to have a shifting relationship over time, 
in the end, the objection itself was both outdated by further scientific discovery—and 
worse, by philosophical analysis. If the Craig-Moreland group is correct, the question of 
dualism should be decided on philosophical grounds, not scientific.
In this paper I hope I have shown that despite first appearances, the libertarian 
who adopts dualism to preserve freedom cannot be indicted on the grounds that 
conservation laws are broken. I have surveyed three groups of responses which I think 
help to show how the conservation problem is at best a fleeting one, and that despite 
the controversy of conservation laws, the objection might after all be predicated on 
a misunderstanding of the interaction itself between soul and body. Maybe it is a 
meaningless question to ask “how” the interaction takes place, maybe not. Perhaps, 
libertarian dualism doesn’t solve anything, and we have fixed a problem for nothing. 
Again -maybe, maybe not. To be honest, I haven’t made up my mind yet. But I don’t 
see why libertarian dualism should be ruled out of the live explanatory options on the 
philosophical scene today in virtue of the objection given by Elizabeth of Bohemia 
to Descartes. At any rate, despite the route we take, it cannot be said that a law has 
been plausibly broken—and so the wrongly convicted libertarian dualism can enter 
into the world of philosophical disputation once again as a “viable competitor”.28 
27 I suppose ad hoc only relative to certain ontologies.
28 Lowe, “The Problem of Psychophysical Causation”, 276. By logical implication, naturally, this renders, for instance, 
the notion of ‘life after death’ logically possible. Consider Richard Swinburne’s concluding remarks of his paper “From 
mental/physical identity to substance dualism”: “Since I am a pure mental substance, I may hope to continue to exist 
after the destruction of my body, and perhaps then to be given a new body. My acquiring a new body will consist in 
the new body being brought into causal interaction with the pure mental substance which is myself. The ‘‘resurrection 
of the body’’ of all humans at the ‘‘last day’’ (the ‘‘General Resurrection’’) is a central Christian doctrine. Catholics, 
Orthodox, and many Protestants also believe that the person continues to exist without a body in the period between 
death and the General Resurrection. Both these doctrines are fully compatible with the account of human nature which 
I have defended in this paper.” Printed in Dean Zimmerman and Peter van Inwagen’s Persons: Human and Divine (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 164-165. 
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29 Descartes, Meditations, Meditation II, 127.
 
Descartes’ perceptive remark at the end of Mediation II, then, remains relevant:
“But because it is difficult to rid one’s self so promptly of an opinion to 
which one has been long accustomed, it will be desirable to tarry for some 
time at this stage, that, by long continued meditation, I may more deeply 
impress upon my memory this new knowledge.”29
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